Monetary Policy Strategies by Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 
MONEIARY POLICY SIRATEGIES 
Robert Flood 
Peter Isard 
Working Paper No.  2770 
NATIONAL BUREAU  OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
1050 Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 
November 1988 
Ihis research is part of NBER's research program in International Studies. 
Any opinions expressed are those of the authors not those of the National 
Bureau  of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper #2770 
November 1988 
MONETARY POLICY  STRATEGIES 
ABSTRACT 
The paper considera  the merits of rulea and discretion  for monetary 
policy when the structure  of the macroeconomic  model and the probability 
distributions  of disturbances  are not well defined.  It is argued that 
when it is costly  to delay  policy reactions  to seldom-experienced  shocks 
until  formal  algorithmic  learning  has been accomplished,  and when time 
consistency  problems are significant,  a mixed strategy  that combines a 
simple  verifiable  rule  with discretion  is attractive.  The paper also 
discusses  mechanisms  for mitigating  credibility  problems and emphasizes 
that arguments  against various  types  of simple  rules lost their force  under 
a mixed strategy. 
Robert  Flood  Peter Isard 
Research Department  Research  Department 
International  Monetary Fund  International  Monetary Fund 
Washington,  DC  20431  Washington,  DC  20431 Robert Flood 
Peter  Isard  j/ 
Monetary  Policy  Strategies 
I.  Introduction 
Although the major industrial  countries  have experimented  with 
different  strategies  for monetary  policy since  the mid-l970s,  a number of 
basic issues  remain  unresolved.  These  issues  include:  (1)  the 
importance  of monetary policy  credibility  and the roles for rules and 
discretion;  (2) the relative attractiveness  of monetary growth  rates, 
exchange  rates, and other  variables as targets  or objectives  for policy; 
and (3) the appropriate  degree  of complexity  to incorporate  into state- 
contingent  procedures  for adjusting  the  settings  of policy instruments  in 
response to new information  about the economy. 
This paper addresses  these  and other issues  that are basic to the 
design  and implementation  of policy strategies  in  practice.  The paper 
begins by developing  a simple anslytic framework  that can be used to 
compare the implications  of different  monetary policy strategies  for an 
open economy in which social  welfare depends negatively  on both price 
level instability  and deviations  of output  from its  full  employment  level 
(Section  II).  Under the assumptions  that the structure  of the economic 
model is known and that disturbances  to the economy  can be characterized 
as having well-defined  probability  distributions,  three  alternative 
policy  strategies  are compared (Section  III).  These strategies  are: 
j/  We thank  Kenneth Rogoff for helping us formulate issues  at an early 
stage and Elhanen Helpman and Dale Henderson  for valuable reactions  and 
discussions.  However,  they  should  neither be blamed for,  nor assumed to 
agree completely  with,  our views. -2- 
(1) discretion,  (2) the optimal  non-state-contingent  rule for monetary 
growth,  and (3) the optimal state contingent  rule for monetary growth. 
The paper then turns to issues arising from uncertainty  about the 
structure  and parameters  of the macroeconomic  model  and the nature of 
economic  disturbances (Section  IV).  Although it is possible to use new 
information  to continuously  re-evaluate  the model in a systematic  manner, 
and to specify well-defined  procedures  for adjusting  the settings of 
monetary policy instruments  in response  to new information,  it would  be 
difficult  for society to monitor compliance  with a complicated  state- 
contingent  policy strategy in the context  of period-by-period  revisions in 
the estimated  macroeconomic  model.  Moreover it may be costly or 
impossible  to learn  much quickly about the nature of seldom-experienced 
disturbances,  and delaying  policy reactions  until formal,  algorithmic, 
learning  has been accomplished  may be very costly  to society.  Thus,  in 
the presence  of distortions  that  generate time-inconsistent  incentives  for 
the monetary authorities,  attempts  to rely on a complicated  state- 
contingent  strategy could  give rise to credibility  problems. 
While the problems associated  with complicated  state-contingent 
strategies  have led some economists  to propose  the adoption  of simple 
monetary rules,  this paper shows that the strategy  of mixing a simple 
rule with discretion  can be preferable  both to rigid  adherence to the 
rule and to complete  discretion (Section  V).  The paper also discusses 
the role of institutional  arrangements  for mitigating  monetary policy 
credibility  problems (Section  VI)  and the choice  of variables for simple 
monetary rules (Section  VII).  It is emphasized  that the relative merits 
of different  choices of variables for a monetary  rule may depend on -3- 
whether the policy  strategy calls  for rigid adherence  to the rule or for 
mixing  the rule  with discretion.  A final  aection  provides concluding 
remarks. 
II.  The Analytic  Framework 
This section develops a simple  analytic  framework  that aheda light 
on a number of issuea  that arise in adopting  a monetary policy strategy 
for an open economy.  Following  conventional  practice,  we consider an 
economy in which society  dislikes deviations  of output from its  full 
employment  level and also dislikes  price  level instability.  In this 
context, it is assumed for simplification  that the objective  of monetary 
policy is to minimize the loss function: 
(1)  —  -  + a(P  > 0, 
where y  is the logarithm of output in period  t, 5 is the logarithm  of 
full employment  output,  Pt LS the logarithm  of the price level, 
and a is a strictly  positive  weight that  society places on price level 
stabilization  relative to output  stabilization.  j/ 
Following  Gray (1976), Ganzoneri (1985) and others,  we assume  that 
output is produced by labor,  that the nominal wage rate is set in a 
contract negotiated  prior to the realization  of the price level,  and that 
the employment  contract calls  for workers to supply  whatever amount  of 
j/  We abstract, in our single-period  optimization from issues  involving 
"reputation"  of the policymaker.  For a survey  of issues  concerning 
reputation,  see Rogoff (1987). -4- 
labor  is demanded  by firms at the negotiated  wage rate.  These assumptions 
are taken  to imply that,  in combination,  the production function  and the 
labor demand  function  yield a relationship  in  which output is a decreasing 
function  of the real cost of a unit of labor: 
(2)  y—d 
- c(w 
- 
Here,  wt is the logarithm  of the wage rate,  c and d are parameters,  and 
t  is a  mean zero productivity  shock.j,'  It is also convenient  to assume 
that  wage setters  know the output supply  function and act to minimize the 
expected squared deviation  of output (employment)  from some implicit 
target  level (g) that may differ from the full  employment  concept that 
enters the social loss function.  2/  Thus,  the wage level is determined 
from the first  order condition 
2 
(3)  r—  E1(y-) 
— 0 
which, together  with (2), implies 
(4)  wt — Ejp + 
]J  Assuming that the logarithm  of the production  function is 
yt — A  + 8lt + Xt,  where lt is the logarithm  of labor input, Xt is the 
shock to the production  function and 0 C  B < 1,  then p  — xt/(l-B). 
2/  See Rogoff (1985)  for one possible  elaboration  of this approach. 
Rogoff defines  as the level of output  (employment)  that  would arise  if 
contracts  could  be negotiated after  observing  the productivity shock and 
all other  period t information. -5- 
Substitution  of (4) into (2) yields an output  supply  relationship: 
(5)  yt —  + c(pt - Ejp) + 
which is similar to the standard  rational  expectations supply  function 
introduced  by Lucas (1972).  Substitution  of (5) into (1) implies 
(6)  * 
—  [c(pt 
- Ejp) 
-  K  + Pt]2 + a[pt 
-  Pt-li2 
(7)  *t — [cOrt - Etllrt) 
-  +  t'ti + alrt2 
where t  — Pt 
-  Pt-I.  is the rate of inflation  and 
(8)  sc—y- 
is the difference  between the social  concept of full employment  output 
and the level  of output that  wage setters  implicitly  target  when 
negotiating  their  wage contracts.  The existence  of "distortions"  such as 
unemployment  compenaation or income  taxation--or  of incentives  for wage 
setters  to maximize the welfare of some subset  of the labor force that is -6- 
already employed (or that  has seniority  rights to employment)--may  give 
rise to a situation  in which a is positive. 
To address monetary policy  issues  for an open economy,  it is 
convenient  to use the relationship: 
(9) 
where  lrt*  is the foreign rate of  inflation,  s  is the rate of change of 
the nominal exchange  rate (the rate of change  of the domestic  currency 
price of foreign  exchange),  and  is  a shock to the purchasing  power 
parity  relation.  It is assumed that  monetary authorities  control  base- 
money growth  and that the nominal rate  of depreciation  of the domestic 
currency can he decomposed  into  one component that  varies systematically 
with the differential  between domestic  base-money  growth  rate (bt)  and the 
foreign inflation  (ir), a second  component (it) reflecting  the purchasing 
power  parity shocks,  and a third  part (vt) that reflects  other elements 
responsible  for nominal exchange  rate  movements.  This relationship  is 
given  by:  jJ 
(10)  b 
-  -  +  v 
j/  The formulation  is intended  to be a stripped-down  version of a 
flex-price  model. -7- 
To simplify  the later  algebra,  it is assumed  that Etlvt — 0.  Thus, 
under the additional  assumptions  that Vt is exogenous  to domestic  policy 
and uncorrelated  with p, /  and the distortion  term (ic)  is time and 
policy invariant,  equations  (9) and (10) can be combined to yield: J 
(11) 
and 
(12)  — [c(b 
+ v  -  E1b) 
-  +  ]2  + a[b  + v)2 
To simplify  notation further,  it is convenient  to transform  variables and 
to express  the policy  problem as that of minimizing  the social loss 
function 
(13)  Lt 
— (bt 
+ v  - E1b 
- k + u)2 
+ a(b  +  v)2 
where Lt — t/c2,  k — ic/c,  Ut — pt/c,  and a — a/c2. 
Note that  while our primary interest  lies in analyzing  monetary 
policy for an open economy,  equations (11) 
-  (13)  apply  not only to an 
j/  Allowing correlations  between the various shocks  would introduce 
covariances  into our later analysis,  but would not change  any of our 
basic  points.  We have refrained  from analyzing  exchange rate regimes in 
our setup  because of the key role played  in exchange  rate regime choice 
literature  by the covariances  we are assuming  away. 
21  While our main points  are robust  to many relaxations  of the white 
noise and independence  assumptions  about the shocks,  things  would be much 
more complicated  in the realistic  setting  where the coefficient  on bt in 
equation (10) was not known with certainty. -8- 
open economy with stochastic  tens in the purchasing  power parity 
relation and the nominal exchange rate equation,  but also to a closed 
economy  with white noise in the relationship  between inflation  and base- 
money growth. 
IlL  Comparisons  of Alternative  Strategies 
The analytic framework  developed  in the previous section  will now be 
used to compare social  welfare-  -as measured  by the expected  value of the 
social loss function- -under  (1) a strategy  of monetary discretion,  (2) the 
optimal non-state-contingent  rule for money growth,  and (3)  the optimal 
state  contingent  rule for monetary growth.  jJ  It should  be emphasized 
that in any discussion  of the optimal  design of monetary  policy,  a central 
consideration  is the extent  to which the structure  of the macroeconomic 
model is known, the relevant  economic  variables  are observable,  and the 
disturbances  to the economy can be characterized  in terms  of well-defined 
probability  distributions.  In this section it is assumed that  both the 
monetary authority  and the private sector  know the macroeconomic 
structure,  can deduce  ut and  vt from  observable  variables and their 
knowledge  of the parameters  of the model ex  post,  and have accurate ex 
ante information  about the probability  distributions  from which ut and Vt 
are  drawn. 
1.  Discretion 
Under discretion,  the monetary  authority sets bt to minimize (13) 
subject to the observed  values  of ut and vt,  and,  most importantly, 
j/  In a companion  paper,  we include  a fixed  exchange rate among the 
monetary policies that we study.  Such a consideration  is not pursued 
presently  because we have assumed  Vt and ut to be uncorrelated,  which 
removes most of the  interesting  aspects of exchange rate  regime choice. -9- 
subject to a predetermined  value of Etjlrt.  The first order  condition 
for a minimum of (14) with respect to bt is: 
(14)  b 
— -  v  +  1(E1b 
+ k  - 
Ut) 
l+a 
Private agents understand  the monetary authority's  motives,  so they form 
their  expectations  of base-money  growth  by taking the expectation  of bt in 
equation (14).  Combining  this expectation  with the expectation  of 
equation (11) yields: 
(15)  — Eib 
— k/a 
This expression  links the inflationary  bias that  arises  under discretion 
to the distortion term  k.  If k were zero,  deviations  of output from its 
full employment  level  would also be zero in the absence of inflation 
surprises and productivity  shocks (recall conditions (5) and (8)),  and 
there  would  be no inflationary  bias. 
To evaluate social  welfare,  substitute  (15)  into (14)  to obtain: 
(16)  bD  —  -  v  -  +  k 
l+a  a 
where b  is base growth  under discretion.  Thus,  from (5),  the realized 
loss from discretion  is: 
(17)  L— k2ai(k÷ ii't2 -  10  - 
and  the expected  loss is: 
(18)  —  k  +  a 
a  l+a 
where  V(u) is the variance  of Ut conditional on information  from period 
t-l.  j/  The first  tern in (18) reflects  the expected loss associated 
with whatever  output or labor  market distortions  are responsible  for the 
inflation  bias, while the second  term  reflects the loss associated  with 
fluctuations  in  productivity. 
2.  The optimal  non-state-contingent  rule 
Next consider the implications  of following  a non-state-contingent 
rule for money growth--that  is, a rule  in which the setting of bt is 
independent  of expected shocks  to the economy  as characterized  by the 
disturbances  Ut and vt.  Given that the model contains  no variables that 
change  predictably  over time,  one rule that  might be considered  would set 
bt equal to that constant  b that  minimizes  the expected  value of the  loss 
function  when private agents  have rational  expectations  such that 
Etibt — b.  For such a rule,  b would appear  only in  the second term of 
the loss function (13),  and since a constant  b is uncorrelated  with the 
vt shocks,  the loss-minimizing  rule of this type is b — 0. 
j/  We are assuming  that policy strategies  in this uncertain environment 
are evaluated  using the expectation  of the loss  function. -  11  - 
From  equation  (13),  the realized  loss from following  the optimal 
non-state-contingent  rule is: 
(19)  L 
— 
(Vt 
+ u  -  k)2  + a2 
and the expected  loss is: 
(20)  —  k2  + (1 + a)V(V) + V(u), 
where V(v) is the Variance of  Vt. 
Now compare (18) and (20).  Note that even for the closed economy 
case  with perfect correlation  between inflation  and base-money  growth- 
- 
that  is,  for the case Vt = 0  for all t--the  preference  ordering  between 
discretion  and the optimal  non-state  contingent  rule depends on the size 
of the distortion  term relative to the Variance of the productivity  shock, 
as well as on the weight  that society  places on inflation  stabilization 
relative to output stabilization. It is readily apparent that the rule 
dominates in the nonstochastic  case.  It is also apparent,  however, that 
discretion  becomes increasingly  attractive  as the variance of the 
productivity  shock increases,  and also becomes more attractive  as the 
relationship  between the inflation  rate and base-money growth  becomes 
noisier (i.e., as V(v) increases).  j/  These comparisons  reflect  the fact 
that discretion  has the undesirable  consequence  of generating  an 
inflationary  bias whenever there  are distortions  affecting  the 
determination  of output,  but also  has the desirable  consequence  of 
j/  Had we allowed co-variance  between ut and Vt this conclusion  would 
need to be altered accordingly. -  12  - 
allowing  the monetary authority to offset  some of the undesirable  effects 
of either  productivity  shocks  or noise in the relationship  between 
inflation  and base-money  growth.  jJ 
3.  The optimal  state-contingent  rule 
The optimal state-contingent  rule for monetary growth is the 
strategy  that mimics the discretion  strategy (16) without including  a 
response to the distortion  term k: 21 
(21)  b 
—  -vt- 
1+a 
Under this rule 
s  r  au  i2  ru  ,2 
(22)  Lt 
—  ......._1..  - 
ic]  +  a{tj  1+a  1+a 
and 
(23)  EtiL 
—  2  +  a 
V(u) 
l+a 
Note from (18) and (20) that this strategy  dominates  the other strstegies 
we have considered. 
j/  These  comparisons  ignore  additional  "accountability"  considerations 
that  might arise to the extent that the central bank may have different 
preferences  than society at large  and might  not seek to minimize the 
social  loss function  if left to its own discretion. 
2/  From the structure  of the model  and the assumption  of uncorrelated 
disturbances,  it is intuitively  clear that the optimal state contingent 
strategy  must  have a linear  form  bt — out + $vt.  Under the assumption  of 
model-consistent  expectations,  it is straightforward  to show that the 
coefficients  in (21) describe the values  of o and  fi  that minimize  the 
social loss function. -  13  - 
Note  also,  however, that  while b  is an optimal  rule,  it is not a 
time-consistent  discretionary  strategy  and therefore  expectations 
predicated  on it as a strategy  are not rational  unless the central  bank 
can somehow be precommitted  to follow  the strategy.  jJ  If at time t-l, 
in the absence of limits  on central  bank discretion,  the private sector 
had believed an announcement  that the central  hank at time t would follow 
implying  Etlbt — Ejb — 0, then it can be shown that for 
& — k/(l+a), EjL(b  + &Et.jbt  — 0)  < EtjL.  This would provide a 
temptation  for the monetary authority  to increase  social  welfare by 
deviating  from the announced  strategy  at time t.  Consequently,  the 
monetary  authority could  not achieve L  under discretion  because the b 
strategy  would not be credible  to market  participants  who rationally 
perceived  the central bank's incentive  to shift from b  to b  + 6. 
Without the ability to precommit  to a strategy--i.e.,  without 
relinquishing  the discretion  to deviate from  whatever strategy it 
announced-  -  the  minimum expected loss  that the monetary authority  could 
D 
achieve  would be EjL. 
IV.  Issues  Arising From  Uncertainty 
About the Macroeconomic  Model 
If ut and vt were generated  by well-understood  sources and  were 
observable  to the monetary  authority and to society, then society could 
design its institutions  to provide strong incentives  for the central bank 
to adhere  rigidly to the optimal state  contingent  rule.  Ihe 
j/  See Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Cordon (1983). -  14  - 
precommitment or credibility  problem could  be solved  by making it costly 
for the monetary authority to deviate from the social optimum. 
In practice, however,  monetary authorities  and private agents  must 
operate  with incomplete  information,  not only about the nature of the 
shocks  that  buffet the economy,  but also  about the responses  of output 
and inflation to different types  of shocks.  j/  The oil price shocks  in 
the 1970s  were not perfectly  understood  at the time they  were 
experienced,  and the implications  for output  and inflation  of different 
monetary policy responses  to those  shocks  could not have been predicted 
with much confidence.  2/  The implications  of financial  innovation  and 
deregulation  for the relationship  between inflation  and (base) money 
growth  is still  not well understood.  The appropriate  monetary policy 
response to the stock  market collapse  of October 1987 was,  in general 
terms,  widely  agreed upon in advance,  but the question of how much 
liquidity  to leave in the system  after  stock  prices had stabilized  at 
lower levels  could  not be answered  with  much confidence.  Similarly,  the 
implications  of large  changes in exchange  rates for output and inflation 
cannot  be predicted  with much confidence  when the reasons for the exchange 
rate changes  are not well understood. 
What type of monetary  policy  makes the most sense  when there  is 
considerable  uncertainty  about  both the structure  of the macroeconomic 
j/  Policymakers  are not so concerned  about  how to respond to often- 
experienced  disturbances;  they have learned from experience  and advice  how 
to make such responses  and these  responses  could  be codified into an 
evolving  rule.  Indeed,  the overlapping  tenures of central bank staff 
contributes  to the development  of "central  bank tradition",  which is a 
form of evolving  rule. 
2/  See Rogoff (1985)  for a treatment  of some aspects of uncertainty  in 
this setting. -  15  - 
model  and  the nature of economic disturbances?  In  part,  the answer 
depends on whether there  is a basis for believing that the time 
consistency  problem is a significant  concern. 
The reasons for believing that the time consistency  problem is 
indeed  a significant  concern include  not only the existence of 
unemployment  compensation,  union bargaining  power and a distorting  income 
tax system,  but also the fact that  monetary  policy is conducted in an 
environment  in which different  political  pressure groups implicitly  want 
the authorities  to minimize different  loss functions  and make strong 
efforts to influence  the choice of central  bank governors.  The latter 
fact does not necessarily  imply that discretionary  monetary policy  has 
induced an inflationary  bias in the past.  jJ  Rather,  it simply  recognizes 
that in a democratic  society  there  are constant  political pressures for 
central banks to make choices that invalidate  what market participants  had 
previously  been led to expect. 
We will assume,  accordingly,  that  we are  interested  in devising a 
monetary policy strategy  for an economy in which time consistency  is 
indeed  a relevant issue,  and we will also assume (perhaps  heroically) 
that the parameters  of the social loss function are well defined and 
stable  over time.  If the economic  structure  and the probability 
distributions  of economic disturbances  were well known, the policy 
problem could be viewed as a matter of designing institutional  mechanisms 
for overcoming  the  time  consistency  problem by credibly precommitting  the 
j/  Many would argue that relative to the monetary rules that some 
political interest  groups  might have suggested,  the presence of monetary 
discretion in the major industrial  countries  has had deflationary 
consequences  during the l9SOs. -  16  - 
monetary  authorities  to following  the optimal state contingent  rule.  (The 
use of institutional  mechanisms  to mitigate  monetary policy credibility 
problems  will be discussed  in Section  VI below.) 
We have in mind a situation  where the policymaker  must operate in an 
environment  containing  some aspects  quite  different than those  portrayed 
in typical economic  models.  In particular  we assume that the policymaker 
must react to both recurring  and nonrecurring  events.  Even without full 
information  about parameters  and distributions,  optimal reactions  to 
recurring  events  can be codified  into a rule.  For the recurring  part of 
the environment  new information  can be used to continuously  re-evaluate-  - 
in a systematic  and statistically  appropriate  manner-  - the  structure  and 
structural  parameters  of the economy and the nature  and probability 
distributions  of economic disturbances.  Because there  may be important 
gains  from  allowing the central  bank to make use of the latest  available 
information  in determining  the settings  of its policy instruments,  this 
conditioning  procedure seems  useful  and appropriate  for feeding informa- 
tion into the day-to-day  problems  facing  the policymaker. 
On the other  hand there is another  part of the policymaker's 
environment,  which is not so amenable  to codification  of reactions.  This 
part involves  seldom-experienced  events  like  wars,  commodity-price 
shocks,  asset market  panics,  or horizon-expanding  inventions.  The nature 
of these events  makes attempts  at policy  precommitment  prior to the event 
seem far fetched. -  17  - 
V.  The  Strategy  of  Mixing  a  Simple  Rule  with  Discretion 
Uncertainty  and  ignorance  about macroeconomic  behavior-  -  in 
combination  with time conaiatency  problems-  -has  led some economists to 
propose simple  rules for monetary  policy.  McCallum (1988, p.3) argues, 
for example, that "neither  theory  nor evidence  points convincingly  to any 
one of the many competing  models of the dynamic interaction  between 
nominal and real  variables" and proposes  a simple  rule that performs  well 
in counterfactual  simulation  experiments  conducted  with a variety of 
structural  models of the economy.  j,J 
The attractiveness  of simple  rules is also auggested implicitly  by 
past policy  practices,  which  have included  non-state-contingent  money 
growth targets and exchange rate stabilization  objectives.  It is 
difficult  to imagine that a complicated  state  contingent  rule would be 
attractive  to monetary authorities  or politically  acceptable  to the 
public  at large,  although  it is relatively  easy to imagine that a simple 
state  contingent  rule for money growth (e.g.  ,  a  rule  calling explicitly 
for countercyclical  behavior) could  be acceptable. 
This section of the paper argues  that rigid adherence  to a simple 
rule may be inferior  to the strategy  of mixing  a simple  rule with 
discretion.  The possible gains from a mixing  strategy can be illustrated 
using the framework  built earlier.  We presume, to begin with,  that 
society has identified  the rule that it wants the central bank to follow 
in the absence of situations  calling for discretion;  this rule  may be 
1/  McCallum's rule  prescribes settings  for the monetary base that are 
intended to keep nominal aggregate  demand  growing smoothly at a non- 
inflationary  rate.  See Flood and Iaard (1988) for an analysis of the 
Mccallum proposal. -  18  - 
either  state  contingent  or non-state-contingent,  as long  as it is easy for 
society to ascertain  whether the rule  has been followed ex  post.  To 
capture the fsct that society  wants the central  bank to exercise 
discretion  only  when there  are relatively  large payoffs in terms of the 
social  loss function,  we assume  that the central  bank has been motivated 
to minimize the sum of the social  loss function  L (as specified  by 
condition (13)) plus a cost that arises  whenever policy settings deviate 
from the rule.  j/ 
For purposes of providing a simple  illustration,  we consider the 
analytic framework  used in Section II under the assumptions  that vt—0 and 
that the ut shocks are not well-understood  in the sense that neither 
society  nor the policymaker  has enough  experience  with the  shocks  to 
parameterize the shock's  distribution.  For present  purposes,  ut 
represents  uncertainty.  Having  simplified  the problem  by assuming away 
all of the shocks  coming  from  well-understood  distributions,  we also 
assume,  consistently,  that  the rule that society  wants the central bank to 
follow  is the optimal non-state-contingent  rule b  — 0.  2/  We further 
2/  From the point  of view of our example it makes little  difference 
whether society  imposes  the cost on itself (perhaps  in the form of a 
costly  institutional  adjustment)  or imposes  the cost directly on the 
central  bank (perhaps  in the form  of reduced bonuses or endless 
Congressional  testimony).  We sdopt the simplest structure  by assuming 
that the cost is imposed  on the monetary authority  snd we assume that the 
cost is not a deadweight  loss to society as a whole. Other examples can be 
constructed  with alternative  cost assumptions. 
2!  In the presence of well-understood  shocks,  a verifiable  state 
contingent  rule  would be more attractive. -  19  - 
assume  that  the distribution  of ut shocks is symmetric,  and we consider a 
threshold  size 9  and an associated  probability  q such that 
(24)  q  —  prob(luI ￿  9 
We view (ut:lutt  > 9)  as a set of "large  poorly-understood  shocks" to 
which society would like the monetary authority  to respond  by overriding 
the rule. L If society  has established  the appropriate  incentives  for 
the monetary authority (i.e.  ,  made  the  cost of overriding  the rule large 
enough but not too large),  then  society can expect  that the rule  will be 
overridden  if, and only if, the shock is large. J In this case,  it is 
straightforward  to show that for some parameter  values the mixed strategy 
is preferable to (i.e. results in a smaller expected  loss than)  both the 
rule and discretion. 
The first step in the demonstration  is to note that: 
(26)  E1b 
—  qE1bIR  +  (l-q)E1bjD 
where EjbR  is the period t-l conditional  expectation  of base 
money growth  given that the rule is being followed,  and EjbtD is the 
We recognize  that our writing down  a parameterization  of the ut 
shocks is in an uneasy tension  with our assumption  that the shocks  come 
from poorly-understood  sources.  One possible interpretation  of our set up 
in a modern idiom is that  the agents  in the model have not converged to 
rational expectations  concerning  ut.  In this environment,  with little 
known about the distribution  of ut, we would expect considerable 
disagreement about  the parameters in (24). 
21  In a companion  paper,  we show  how to set the cost optimally from 
the perspective  of the social  loss function  both if the social loss 
includes the cost and if it does not. -20- 
t-l conditional  expectation  of bt given discretion.  Recalling that a 
discretionary  strategy  must satisfy  the first  order condition (14)  it 
follows  that: 
(26) bID 
—  1(Et1bt 
+ k  - u)  l+a 
where we have used  vt — 0.  Next,  use equation (17) and the condition 
btIR — 0  to derive: 
(27)  Et1btID —  k 
a+q 
The q, which is the probability  of following  the rule,  shows up in 
equation (27) because this scheme  modifies agents'  rational  expectations 
of base growth.  As long as q  is positive,  the scheme  reduces expected 
base growth  conditional  on discretion  and will therefore  reduce the 
inflationary  bias.  Unconditional  expected  base growth,  which is obtained 
from equations (25) and (27),  is: 
(28)  Et1b 
—  (l-q)k 
a+q 
Next,  consider  that the expected  value of the loss function  under 
the mixed strategy is: 
(29)  Et1L 
—  qE1L 
+  (l-q)E1LM1 -  21  - 
where  is the loss under the mixed strategy,  is the  loss  if the 
rule is followed  and LM  is the loss if discretion  is exercised,  given 
that  private agents  know that the mixed strategy  has been adopted.  From 
(13) and (29)  it can be seen that: 
(30)  L 





(31)  EtIL 
—  (1+a)2 k2  +  V(uIR), 
(a+q)2 
where V(uJR) is the variance of u conditional  on the rule,  which is 
equivalent to being conditional  on u being "small."  Similarly,  from 
equations (13),  (14),  and (28)  it can be seen that: 
(32)  LM 
— 
[ 
a  k  -  a 
u  12  a  (a+q)  (li-a) 
and 
(33)  EtlLM 




where V(uID) is the variance of u  conditional  on discretion,  which is 
equivalent  to being conditional  on u being "large." -  22  - 
Combining these two branches of the loss function  yields: 
(34)  EtlL  +  qV(ujR)  + (l-q)a 
V(uID). 
a+q  (l+a) 
N  0 
Note from (18) that EtjLt — EjL when q —  0,  since  in this case 
V(uID) — V(u).  Similarly,  note from (20)  that EtlL  — EtlL when q — 1, 
since  in  this  case  V(utR)  = V(u). 
So far, our demonstration  is simply  a formalism.  What we will show 
next is that  under a range  of parameter  values the mixed strategy is 
superior to both the optimal  rule and discretion.  Since  we simply  want to 
show a possibility,  an example  will suffice.  Recall (24) and consider a 
situation  in which ut is uniformly distributed  on the interval [-U,U]  such 
that q — 9/U for any choice  of 9  on  the relevant interval.  For this 
distribution,  V(u) — U2/3,  V(ulD) — (l-q3)U2/3(l-q) and  V(uIR) — q2U2/3. 
Furthermore,  by substituting  these conditional  variances into (34) and 
minimizing EtlL  with respect  to q, it can  be shown that  the optimal 
value of q must satisfy  the condition:  j/ 
j/  To obtain  this condition,  substitute  the conditional  variance 
expressions  into (34) and set the derivative  of this expression  with 





from which equation (34)  follows. -  23  - 
(35)  q2 + aq 
-  (l+a)k/U  — 0. 
The probability  q need not be an object  of choice,  we are simply checking 
to see that if q is chosen  to minimize (34) then the resulting q at the 
minimum is a number  between zero and one.  If the resulting  q is not 
between zero and one then it is impossible,  in this example,  for the 
mixing strategy to dominate  both the optimal rule and discretion.  If we 
find,  however, that the value of q that  minimizes (34) does lie between 
zero and one,  then  we will have constructed  an example  where the mixing 
strategy is superior  to both rules  and discretion.  Such an example arises 
when society  places equal  weight on output stabilization  and price level 
stabilization  (i.e., when a — I  in condition (13)), since in that case the 
unique  positive root of (35) is between zero and one when k/U < 1.  ,./ 
It should  be noted that the mixed strategy  is not always  optimal. 
Indeed,  if k is large or if U is small,  the rule  will dominate a mixed 
strategy.  Note,  however, that if  U  is extremely  large  relative to k, then 
discretion  has  an advantage relative  to the rule,  but (as long as k is 
positive) the mixed strategy  will beat both the rule and discretion. 
More generally,  it should  be emphasized  that the support that such 
analysis  provides for strategies  that combine  rules  and discretion 
requires careful  interpretation.  In  particular,  the analysis does not 
j,J  The  reader  should  not interpret  the moments of the u distribution 
to be agreed  upon numbers--they  would be the subject of much dispute. 
Indeed,  it seems to us to be a perfectly  respectable  position to claim 
that u does  not have any finite  moments.  Of course,  such a position, 
while respectable,  is not very helpful and we are proceeding as if the 
rules  versus discretion  disputants  had agreed  on a set of moments to use 
when discussing  u. -  24  - 
support the strategy  of announcing  a rule  but not taking the rule 
seriously,  as has sometimes  appeared  to have been the practice in the 
past.  Rather,  as we interpret  the analysis,  the mixed strategy  calls for 
the authorities  to follow  a precisely  defined rule in "normal 
circumstances",  but to be prepared to override  the rule in "abnormal 
circumstances".  In implementing  such a strategy,  society  would have to 
think  carefully  about  how it wants to define "abnormal  circumstances". 
Our example interpreted  abnormal  circumstances  as synonymous  with large 
and poorly  understood  shocks,  but it might also be appropriate  for the 
central  bank to override  the rule temporarily  whenever the ultimate 
target  variables  had drifted  too far off their intended  course. 
VI.  Institutional  Arrangements  for 
Mitigating  Credibility  Problems 
Because we know from the time consistency  literature  that even 
authorities  concerned  solely  with maximizing  social  welfare may be teapted 
to deviate from  the optimal  rule in the presence of distortions  (recall 
Section 11.4),  it is important  to establish  mechanisms  for overcoming 
monetary policy  credibility  problems.  In some countries,  the existence of 
independent  central  banks, and the practice of granting  long and 
overlapping  tenures to central bank governors,  may provide an 
institutional  framework  within  which an announced  monetary  policy strategy 
has more credibility  than  would  be the case if monetary policy  was 
controlled  by elected officials  with shorter  terms  of office. 
Nevertheless,  even independent  central banks  have credibility  problems in 
the sense that their announcements  are not always accepted  at face  value. 
As emphasized  above,  monetary  policy credibility  problems could  he -  25  - 
easily  resolved if the structure  of the macroeconomic  model was well known 
to all economic  agents,  if all relevant  economic  variables  were 
observable,  and if all disturbances  to the economy could  be characterized 
as having  well defined  probability  distributions.  In that case,  society 
would derive  no benefit from allowing  the central bank to exercise 
discretion  and,  conversely,  would  have nothing to lose from resolving the 
monetary policy  credibility  problem by requiring  the central bank to 
adhere rigidly  to the optimal state  contingent  rule.  By contrast, when 
the central bank has the opportunity  to base the settings  of its policy 
instruments  on better information  about the economy than  private agents 
have (or hsd)  in making contracts  for wages and other relevant  variables, 
eliminating  monetary policy discretion  can have the undesirable 
consequence  of preventing  central banks from  performing  a beneficial 
stabilization  role. 
In analyzing the difficulties  that can arise in resolving  monetary 
policy credibility  problems  when central  banks  have "private 
information"--i.e.,  different  information  than other  economic agents can 
obtain or verify-  -Canzoneri  (1985)  has noted that "private information" 
includes  both superior information  about the economy and information  about 
the policymaking process that the private sector  cannot  reconstruct.  Our 
discussion in Section  IV has emphasized  that the policymaker's  environment 
includes  seldom-experienced  events--such  as wars,  commodity  price shocks, 
asset  market psnics,  or horizon-expanding  inventions--that  are not 
amenable to any codification  of policy reactions.  In our view,  it is this 
environment-  -  superimposed on a world in which private agents find it 
rational (based  on transactions  and negotiations  costs)  to enter into -  26  - 
contracts  for wages and other  variables  for fixed  periods of tiae in forms 
that are not fully  state contingent  or subject  to continuous  revision-- 
that creates  the possibility  for discretionary  central bank responses to 
seldom-experienced  eventa  to play a valuable stabilization  role. 
In considering  the strategy  of mixing a simple rule  with discretion 
in the manner defined in the previous  section,  one of the important issuea 
that arises  is how to limit  the exercise  of central  bank discretion  when 
the circumstances  in which discretionary  responses  are desired cannot  be 
defined very precisely in  advance.  Our formal  analysis  relied on the 
assumption  that the central  bank was induced to minimize the sum of the 
social  loss function  plus a fixed  cost that it incurred  whenever it 
deviated from the rule.  In  practice,  the achievement  of an appropriate 
mix of rule and discretion  seems  likely to depend  on:  (1) the selection of 
a clearly-defined  rule that  can be expected  to steer the economy in a 
direction  broadly consistent  with social  preferences;  (2) the appointment 
of central bankers whose preferences  are closely aligned  with those of 
society at large;  and (3) the imposition  of an appropriate  penalty for 
deviating  from the rule. 
With regard to the first of these  factors,  many countries  have 
allowed their  central  banks  to operate  with very imprecisely  defined 
rules  for monetary growth.  For example:  most monetary targets have been 
specified  as ranges,  few countries  have adopted rules  that preclude 
"drift"  between targets  for successive  years,  a number of countries  have 
shifted their targeting  strategies  from one measure of money to another, 
and some countries  have specified  simultaneous  tsrgets for several 
monetary aggregates  that cannot  easily  be controlled  independently.  Thus, -  27  - 
in the context of the political  viability that  would come from an explicit 
understanding  that rules would  be mixed  with discretion,  there is scope 
for all countries  to define  their  monetary  rules  more precisely.  There 
also may be scope for adopting  more sensible  types  of simple rules- -for 
example,  rules that prescribe  explicit  countercyclical  behavior. 
For some countries, the achievement  of an optimal mix of rule and 
discretion  might also be facilitated  by changes in the process for 
selecting  central  bank governors.  Rogoff (1985) has emphasized  that in 
the context of a time-consistency  problem,  society can sometimes  make 
itself  better off by leaving  monetary policy  at the discretion  of central 
bankers with preferences  that attach  more weight than the preferences  of 
society at large to price level  stabilization  relative  to output 
stabilization.  By contrast,  under the mixed  strategy envisioned in this 
paper, society  wants its central  bankers to adhere  rigidly to a rule under 
"normal"  circumstances,  and only to deviate  from the rule when doing so 
provides  a sufficient  reduction in the value  of the social  loss function. 
Accordingly, in this set up,  it seems  desirable  to appoint  central bankers 
whose preferences  are similar  to those  of society at large. 
Finally,  the issue of how severely  to penalize central banks for 
exercising  discretion  to override the rule may be a natter that can only 
be decided through experimentation. At present, some countries subject 
their  central bankers to regular cross-examinations  by elected officials, 
but it is difficult  for such  procedures  to discipline  central  bankers 
effectively  when announced rules  for monetary policy  are not clearly 
defined.  With a clearly defined  monetary rule,  the costs  imposed  by 
public  cross-examinations  and protestations  might  well dissuade central -  28  - 
bankers  from overriding  the rule  with much frequency.  Regardless  of 
whether  public cross examination  is sufficient  for this purpose,  however, 
the severity of the penalty (or the cross examination)  should  be inversely 
related,  other things  equal,  to the level of confidence  with which it is 
expected that the rule will steer  the economy in a direction consistent 
with social  preferences. 
VII.  The Choice  of Variables  for Monetary Rules 
The adoption  of a mixed  strategy  for monetary  policy  might have an 
important  bearing on the appropriateness  of different  choices of 
variables for monetary rules.  This section  first  discusses  the choice of 
variables for monetary rules  in general,  and subsequently  considers  how 
the arguments  change  when rules can  be overridden in some circumstances. 
1.  Conceptual  distinctions 
Discussions  of monetary policy  strategies  draw conceptual 
distinctions  between three  types  of variables:  policy instruments, 
intermediate  variables,  end ultimate target  variables.  A further 
distinction  can be drawn  between potential  and actual  policy instru- 
ments.  Potential  policy  instruments  are variables that the central 
bank has the ability to control  precisely;  actual  policy instruments  are 
potential instruments  that the central bank chooses to control. 
Historically,  monetary authorities  have typically  chosen  as their 
actual  policy instruments  either  a short-term  market interest  rate 
(such  as the rate at which money  market  participants lend funds 
overnight)  or the quantity of some subset  of the central  bank's 
liabilities  (such  as the aggregate  reserves that commercial  banks hold -  29  - 
at  the central bank).  The exchange  rate is also a potential policy 
instrument  that a central  bank could  control precisely  by offering to buy 
or sell (while  supplies  lasted)  unlimited  quantities  of foreign currency 
at whatever exchange  rate level it wished to establish. 
In theoretical  discussions  of the optimal  design of monetary policy, 
the objectives and preferences  of policymakers  are generally  con- 
ceptualized  in terms  of a policy loss function.  J The ultimate targets 
are the variables on which the value of the loss function  directly 
depends.  One of the two important  classes  of ultimate target  variables 
includes  measures of real economic  performance,  such as unemployment 
rates, gaps  between actual  and potential  output,  or rates  of growth  of 
real output.  The other important  class of ultimate target  variables 
includes  measures of price stability.  The emphasis that theoretical 
analysis places on these  two classes of ultimate  targets seems to reflect 
popular sentiments.  21 
Bryant (1980) has identified  four  key characteristics  that differ- 
entiate monetary policy strategies  from each other.  These 
characteristics  are:  (1) the choice  of policy instruments;  (2) the 
choice  between a single-stage  decision  procedure in which instrument 
settings  are linked  directly to the values  of ultimate target  variables, 
or a multi-stage  approach in which instrument  settings are based on values 
,./  The  discussion  in  this section  ignores  discrepancies  between the 
preferences  of policymakers  and the preferences  of society at large. 
21  In the context of our minimally articulated  rational expectations 
model, it is not obvious  why the level  of the inflation  rate should  have 
much direct  weight in the social  loss function.  Nevertheless,  price level 
stabilization is repeatedly  emphasized  as an important  objective of 
society and its policy authorities. -  30  - 
of  intermediate  variables (i.e., variables that are neither ultimate 
targets  nor actual  policy  instruments,  such as monetary aggregates  that 
are defined to include  more than the liabilities  of the central  banks); 
(3) the choice of frequency  with which to review and possibly adjust the 
instrument  setting;  and (4) the choice  of how to incorporate  feedback from 
new information. 
2.  Rules based on monetary asaregates 
Beginning in  1975,  a number  of major industrial  countries  began to 
experiment  with multi-stage  strategies  in which central  banks announced 
and pursued target  growth  rates (or growth  rate ranges)  for selected 
monetary aggregates  as intermediate  variables that  were not directly 
under their control.  j/  Although this paper does not attempt to 
reconstruct  the explanations  that these  countries  provided  when they 
turned  to setting intermediate  targets  for money growth  rates,  it may be 
noted that advocacy of monetary aggregates  targeting  is typically  based 
on:  (1) the belief that the stock of money is reliably  linked to ultimate 
target  variables;  and (2)  the belief that  central banks  have the ability 
to control the stock  of money indirectly  by adjusting their  policy 
instruments. 
The rationale  for a multi-stage  intermediate  targeting  approach can 
be better appreciated  when it is recognized  that in practice the 
objective of monetary  policy is to achieve desirable  outcomes for output 
and the price level  over a multi-period  horizon in a framework in which 
changes in the settings  of policy instruments  affect  output  and/or the 
j/  See Isard  and Rojas-Suarez  (1986) for a review  of the experience 
with monetary aggregates  targeting. -  31  - 
price level with distributed  lags.  In  reality,  the authorities  generally 
have fairly  accurate information  about  contemporaneous  measures of output 
and inflation,  but confront  major difficulties  in forecasting  how the 
future  paths of output  and inflation  will evolve  under different  settings 
of their  policy instruments. 
The difficulty  of forecasting  the evolution  of output  and infla- 
tion,  and of estimating  the effects  on these  ultimate target  variables 
of changes in monetary  policy instruments,  is one of the reasons that 
central banks in the mid-l970s  found it attractive  to adopt the medium- 
term strategy  of setting intermediate  targets  for the growth  rates of 
monetary aggregates.  It was  felt that the effects  of changes in policy 
instrument  settings  could  be predicted  more reliably,  and that 
deviations from targets  could  be observed  more accurately  and corrected 
more quickly,  when targets were specified  in terms  of the monetary 
aggregates rather  than  ultimate target  variables.  Moreover,  it was felt 
that a medium-term  strategy of gradually  declining  growth  rates for 
monetary aggregates  would  be consistent  with steady  real output growth  and 
gradually declining  rates of inflation. 
More than a decade  of experience  has now shown that  monetary 
aggregates targeting  was not as successful  as the authorities  had hoped 
it would be.  Accordingly,  central banks in most of the major industrial 
countries  have been led to abandon or de-emphasize  their intermediate 
targets for monetary aggregates.  The growing disenchantment  with monetary 
aggregates  targeting  has been largely  attributed  to (1)  the instability  of 
velocity (i.e.  of the relationship  between money and nominal GNP) in an 
environment  of financial deregulation  and innovation,  and (2)  the -  32  - 
emergence  of  strong  political  pressures  to  use  the instruments  of monetary 
policy to resist  "disruptive"  movements  in exchange  rates following a 
period in which the extraordinary  rise and fall of U.S. dollar  exchange 
rates  has subjected  producers  and consumers  to major shifts in the terms 
of international  competition. 
3.  Other types of monetary rules 
As possible alternatives  to rules  based on monetary aggregates, it 
has been suggested  that  monetary rules  could  be formulated  in terms  of 
such variables  as nominal interest  rates  or exchange rates,  real interest 
rates or exchange  rates,  interest  rates,  the price level,  real GNP or 
nominal  GNP.  Traditionally,  discussions  of the choice  of variables for 
monetary rules  has been based on a presumption  that the authorities  would 
adhere  rigidly to the rule rather than  pursuing the type of mixed strategy 
suggested in Section  V. 
Under the presumption  that the rule would be applied  rigidly, an 
argument that is often advanced  against adopting  a target  for a nominal 
interest rate or a nominal exchange  rate is that price explosions  (or 
severe  deflations)  could occur if the authorities  prevented  nominal 
interest rates  or exchange  rates from  adjusting following  a rise (decline) 
in inflation  or inflationary  expectations.  j/  A  strong  argument against 
adopting  a target  for either  a real interest rate or a real exchange rate 
is that the authorities  could  not provide an effective anchor  against 
inflation  by simply  allowing  changes in inflation  or inflationary 
expectations to be incorporated  completely  into nominal interest rates or 
jJ  See Cagnon and Henderson (1988) for a recent  analysis of nominal 
interest  rate  pegging under alternative  expectations  hypotheses. -  33 
- 
nominal exchange rates. )/  The main argument  against targeting  either the 
price level or the level of real GNP is that  both variables  matter: 
adopting a strategy that  was concerned  only with one of the two major 
classes of ultimate target  variables  could lead to undesirable  outcomes 
for the other.  In this  context,  proponents  of nominal GNP targets  have 
suggested that  joint outcomes  for real  CNP and inflation  would be 
preferable to what likely  would be achieved  under either  real CNP targets 
or price level  targets.  Opponents  of nominal  GNP targets  have argued, 
however, that such rules  do not lead to desirable  poilcy responses  to 
"supply shocks" such as poor  harvests or oil price shocks.  In particular, 
an expansionary  response to the loss in nominal GNP associated  with an 
output  shortfall could not increase the supply  of output  and would thus  be 
inflationary,  while a coritractionary  response to the increase in nominal 
GNP associated  with a rise  in the supply  price of oil or other commodities 
would reinforce the recessionary  effects  of the price rise on aggregate 
demand. 
The arguments change  when the choice  of variables  for monetary rules 
is considered  as part of a policy strategy in which a rule  would be mixed 
with discretion.  In this  context,  many of the arguments  against the use 
of particular  variables in monetary rules  lose their  force. 
While a lengthy reconsideration  of these arguments  is beyond the 
scope  of this paper,  21 it may be noted that a target  for nominal GNP or 
an exchange rate becomes more appealing  when discretion  can be exercised 
jJ  See Adams and Cros (1986) for an analysis of the consequences of 
real exchange rate rules. 
2/  Our companion  papers focus  more extensively  on nominal GNP rules and 
exchange rate stabilization  strategies. -  34  - 
in response to supply  shocks.  A consensus  on a feasible  and appropriate 
target  for nominal CNP growth  might  be much easier  to reach than agreement 
on either the appropriate  macroeconomic  model or the appropriate  relative 
weights to attach  to price level  stability  and real output growth in the 
social objective  function.  j/  Moreover,  while there are wide-ranging 
disagreements  over the appropriate  specifications  of macroeconomic  models 
in general, there  appears to be considerably  less disagreement about the 
reduced form  relationship  between base-money  growth  and nominal GNP.  21 
VIII.  Concluding  Remarks 
During the 1980s,  monetary authorities  in the largest industrial 
countries  have become  more tolerant  of variability  in monetary growth 
rates relative to preannounced  targets or projections,  while giving 
increasing  consideration  to exchange rate  objectives.  j/  Although the 
authorities  have not modified their  broad objective of maintaining 
appropriate  conditions  for sustained  noninflationary  growth,  there are 
important unresolved  questions  about the appropriate  strategy for 
pursuing that objective,  particularly  in the largest countries. 
This paper  has used a simple  analytic  framework  to review and 
reconsider  some of the basic issues  that arise  in designing  and 
1/  See McCallum (1987,1988)  and Flood and Isard(1988)  for discussions 
of (and  counterfactual  simulation  experiments  with) nominal GNP rules for 
the United States. 
21  As McCallum (1987) notes,  however, in the open economy context it 
might be preferable  to specify a target  for some  measure of nominal 
aggregate demand  other than nominal  CNP. 
21  Monetary policy  strategies  have also involved  policy coordination 
among countries  to encourage  the depreciation  of the U.S.  dollar  during a 
period following  the Plaza  Meeting of the Croup of Five countries in 
September 1985,  and to resist  further large changes in exchange  rates 
during the period  since the Louvre  Accord  was announced  in February 1987. -  35  - 
implementing  a strategy  for monetary  policy.  Among the main points are 
the following. 
1.  Under the unrealistic  assumption  that both the monetary 
authorities  and the private sector  know the macroeconomic  structure,  can 
observe all relevant  economic  variables  accurately  ex  post,  and have 
accurate ex ante information  about the probability  distributions  of 
disturbances  to the economy,  the optimal strategy  is a state contingent 
rule rather than the  type of non-state-contingent  monetary targets  that 
countries  have adopted in the past.  j/  To the extent that time 
consistency  problems exist in such  a situation,  the optimal state 
contingent  rule can be made credible  through institutional  mechanisms to 
insure  precommitment. 
2.  The resolution  of credibility  problems and the design  of an 
optimal strategy  become more complicated  when there  is considerable 
uncertainty  about the economic structure  and the nature  of disturbances. 
On the one hand,  the environment  generates  new information  that can be 
used to continuously reevaluate  the structure  or structural  parameters of 
the economy and the nature  of economic  disturbances;  thus,  there  are 
important  potential  gains from  allowing the central  bank to make use of 
the  latest  available  information  in its attempts  to stabilize the economy. 
On the other  hand, when the environment  includes  seldom experienced  events 
that are not amenable to any codification  of policy  reactions, it seems 
virtually impossible  for the private sector  to reconstruct  the 
policymaking  process.  The credibility  of monetary policy  would be 
j/  It can also be shown,  under this unrealistic  assumption,  that a 
fixed  exchange rate strategy  would not be optimal. -  36  - 
questionable in such  circumstances  if the central bank announced  a 
complicated  state contingent  procedure  for setting its policy instruments 
and was allowed to use new information  to make period-by-period  revisions 
of the structural  model  and/or the parameter  estimates  on which its 
instrument  settings  were based. 
3.  While the problems associated  with complicated  state-contingent 
strategies  in an environment  of considerable  model uncertainty  have led 
some economists  to propose  the adoption  of simple  policy  rules, a mixed 
strategy  of combining  a simple  rule  with discretion  may be preferable  both 
to rigid  adherence  to the rule  and to complete  discretion.  The type of 
mixed strategy  we are referring  to here is not a strategy  of announcing a 
rule but not taking  the rule seriously,  as has sometimes  appeared  to have 
been the practice in the past,  but rather  a strategy  that calls for the 
authorities  to follow  a precisely  defined (but simple)  rule in "normal 
circumstances"  and to override the rule only under certain types of 
conditions. 
4.  Institutional  mechanisms  that penalized central  banks for 
exercising  discretion  might  be important  for resolving credibility 
problems under  a mixed strategy,  just as they might  be for precommitting 
the authorities  to adhere  rigidly  to a rule.  In this context, existing 
institutional  oversight  arrangements  (generally  involving  regular cross 
examinations  of central bankers by elected  officials)  might be more 
effective if the rule component  of the mixed strategy  was defined 
precisely. 
5.  In the context of a mixed strategy involving  a simple  rule that 
can be overridden  under certain  types  of conditions,  many of the -  37  - 
arguments against  the use of particular  variables in monetary rules lose 
their  force.  A rule for targeting  nominal  GNP,  for example,  becomes more 
attractive  when the rule can be overridden  in response to supply  shocks. -  38  - 
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